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1957] RECENT CASES
disturb any of the four unities. The legal title is in the vendors, though it be
merely a security interest, so that it could not be said that the unity of title
has been disturbed. If the unity of title remains unchanged then necessarily,
F.e does the unity of time. Mere legal title although in the nature of a security
interest is an interest capable of being held in joint tenancy.7 Although the
interests of each joint tenant have been reduced they remain equal - therefore
unity of interest is maintained. Since physical possession is not required in a
property interest to be capable of being held in joint tenancy,8 unity of pos-
session would not appear to be changed. Some jurisdictions hold that equi-
table conversion does not apply so as to sever the joint tenancy, where all the
joint tenants execute a contract for deedY
The rule in the instant case may give rise to a problem where the vendee
Gf a land contract defaults. Since joint tenancies are disfavored, 1° the re-
scinding of the contract by the vendors in case of default would probably not
iestore the joint tenancy, but a tenancy in common would result."t It is sub-
rnitted that the better rule would be that severance does not occur when joint
tenants execute a contract for deed. Under such rule, default by the vendee
,qrd repudiation by the vendors would leave the joint tenancy intact.
Although the question here involved has never been decided in North
Dakota, it should be noted that the North Dakota Bar Association has taken
cognizance of the problem.12 Their recommendation anticipates the holding of
the instant case, by requiring the executor of the deceased joint tenant to
join with the survivor in a conveyance of the entire fee.
RALPH E. KOENIG.
TAXATION - MISTAKE OF FACT - RECOVERY OF EXCESS PAYMENT. - Plaintiff,
public utility corporation, received 1200 tax statements from various govern-
mental sub-divisions in one year. Statement of the defendant county contained
erroneous computation due to the misplacing of a decimal point in the assess-
nient by the defendant township. As a result plaintiff paid $30,659.36 personal
property taxes in excess of the amount owed. Plaintiff sued the defendants to
recover the excess amount of taxes paid without benefit of a statute authoriz-
ing refunds. The Supreme Court of Michigan, two justices dissenting, reversed
the decision of the lower court and held that the amount of excess taxes paid
without protest was a voluntary payment and could not be recovered in the
absence of statutory provision therefore. Consumer Power Co. v. County of
Muskegon, 78 N.W.2d 223 (Mich. 1956).
In the absence of statute, courts have not favored suits for the refund of
taxes,' but have allowed recovery for overpayment due to mistake in ex-
7. In re Abdullah's Estate, 214 Wis. 336, 252 N.W. 158 (1934) (interests of joint
mortgagees); Williams v. Jones, 175 Wis. 380,'185 N.W. 231, 233 (1921) (dictum)
(existence of joint tenancy based on parties intent).
8. See Thornbug v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N.E. 999 (1893).
9. Watson v. Watson, 5 Ill.2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955) (alternative holding);
In re Estate of Jogminas, 246 I11. App. 518 (1927); Detroit Security Trust Co. v. Kramer,
247 Mich. 468, 226 N.W. 234 (1929).
10. Cases cited note 1 supra.
11. See Swenson and Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies; 38 Minn. L. Rev. 466,
482 (1954).
12. See N. D. Bar Ass'n. Title Examination Standards § 1.12.
1. See State ex rel. Kresge v. Howard, 357 Mo. 302, 208 S.W.2d 247 (1948); 9
Miami L. Q. 237 (1955).
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t-eme cases. 2 Where there is no refund statute, courts have distinguished be-
tween voluntary and involuntary payments: permitting recovery when involun-
tary3 and denying it when voluntary. 4 Recent decisions find courts more in-
dulgent in construing a payment to be involuntary, 5 because of the harsh
penalties for non-payment which effectively operate as technical duress upon
the taxpayer.6 Apparently the present trend is to allow recovery of illegal
taxes when it is justifiable from the facts.7
Although tax payments are considered to be voluntary until proved other-
wise,s it is generally recognized that payment under a mistake of fact - as
distinguished from a mistake of law- is not voluntary and may be recovered.9
A mistake of fact has been distinguished as "a mistake where a person under-
stands the facts to be other than they are, whereas a mistake of law is where
the person knows facts as they really are, but has a mistaken belief as to the
consequences of those facts".10 Under this definition it would seem that a
clerical error on the part of the assessor would be a mistake of fact such as
would permit a recovery of the taxes paid.11 It has been held that the tax-
payer would be permited to recover if there was a mistake of fact regardless
.f his own negligence in investigating or ascertaining the facts.12 If there was
a mistake of fact, failure to protest should not be determinative of whether
payment was voluntary or involuntary.13
2. See, e.g., Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. City of Bridgeport, 103 Conn. '249, 130
Atl. 164 (1925) (Taxpayer owned property in two tax districts using different rates of
taxation. The assessor entered the value of all the property in the district levying the
highest rate. The taxpayer relying on the rates so assessed paid the tax. The court per-
mitted recovery because of the mistake).
3. State ex rel. Kresge v. Howard, 357 Mo. 302, 308 S.W.2d 247 (1948). Contra,
Weil-McClain Co. v. Collins, 395 Ill. 503, 71 N.E.2d 91 (1947).
4. Peterson v. Sundt, 67 Ariz. 312, 195 P.2d 158 (1948). But see N. D. Rev. Code
§ 57-2304 (1943) (Which would appear to eliminate the controversy in the principal case
should it arise in North Dakota, since the statute makes no distinction between voluntary
or involuntary payments and would seem to allow recovery in either case if payment is
due to a mistake).
5. See, e. g., State cx rel. Kresge v. Howard, 357 Mo. 302, 208 S.W.2d 247 (1948);
Brink v. Kansas City, 355 Mo. 860, 198 S.W.2d 710 (1946).
6. See, e.g., State ex rel. American Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds, 270 Mo. 589, 194 S.W.
878 (1917) (Where the license collector refused to issue a license until the taxes assessed
had been paid, and the taxpayer needed the license to continue in business, the court held
there was sufficient technical duress to constitute an involuntary payment and permit re-
covery); Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 272, 71 S.W.2d 242 (1934) (Statute
provided that taxpayer who failed to pay tax would forfeit his right to do business in the
state, and would have the courts closed to him. The court held that the duress may be
either express or implied and the duty to refund the involuntarily paid tax is the same).
7. 11 Va. L. Rev. 134 (1924).
8. North Miami v. Seaway Corp., 151 Fla. 301, 9 So.2d 705, 707 (1942) (dictum).
9. Pettibone v. Cook County, 31 F. Supp. 881 (1940), aff'd. 120 F.2d 850 (8th Cir.
1941); Wendell Foundation v. Moredall Realty Corp., 176 Misc. 1006, 29 N. Y. S.2d
451 (Sup. Ct. 1941); In re Wampler's Estate, 103 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio 1950); McArdle v.
Robertson, 70 S.D. 545, 19 N.W.2d 576 (1945); Stephen v. Board of Equalization, 105
Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732, 733 (1939) (dictum), 3 Cooley, Taxation § 1295 (1924).
10. Wendell Foundation v. Moredall Realty Corp., 176 Misc. 1006, 29 N. Y. S.2d 451,
454 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Jordan v. Brady Transfer and Storage Co., 226 Iowa 13, 284 N.W.
73, 76 (1939) (A mistake of fact was defined as "that which means any mistake except
a mistake of law and a mistake of law means a mistake as to the legal consequences of an
assumed state of facts.")
11. See Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kostecki, 163 Wis. 101, 157 N.W. 559 (1916) (Assessor
had entered two items of property on assessment rolls, one as personal property and the
other as real prdperty. He later decided the items should be reversed and entered the
property on the rolls in their proper classification. He neglected to strike the original entry
however, which resulted in each item being listed twice. Court held this was a clerical
error and a mistake of fact which would permit recovery of the excess amount of tax paid).
12. Its re Wing, 162 Misc. 551, 295 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Surf. Ct. 1937). Contra,
Bridgeport Screw Co. v. City of Bridgeport, 125 Conn. 593, 7 A.2d 649 (1939).
13. State ex rel Kresge v. Howard, 357 Mo. 302, 208 S.W.2d 247 (1948).
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The clerical error involved in the instant case would seem to be a mistake
of fact which caused involuntary payment. Under those circumstances the
plaintiff would be permitted to recover in most jurisdictions unless refunds
were expressly forbidden by statute. The cases cited by the majority in sup-
port of their decision do not stand for the proposition that a mistake of fact
i a voluntary payment. Those decisions turned upon the negligence of the
taxpayer 14 and 'a mistake of law.15 Obviously the county was not entitled to
the full amount of money paid. Even in Michigan the plaintiff would have
been entitled to recover the excess if the court had construed the payment
to be involuntary.16
GERALD W. VANDEWALLE.
ToRTS - CHARTIABLE IMMUNITY - LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF Em-
PLOYEES. - Plaintiff, a paying patient instituted a suit against defendant non-
profit hospital for injuries sustained due to the negligence of defendant's em-
'loyee in permitting the patient to fall from a hospital bed furnished by the
defendant. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's overruling of
defendant's demurrer and held that a nonprofit corporation which had for its
purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital may be liable for the torts
of its servants tinder the doctrine of respondeat superior. Avellone v. St.
John's Hospital, 135 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1956).
It is generally held that a charitable institution is liable for its torts,' but
immunity is usually granted to such institutions for the torts of their em-
ployees.2 Where third parties are involved an exception is sometimes made and
the institution is then held liable for their employees' torts.: In certain juris-
dictions liability of the institution is based on whether or not the patient is
paying for the services; 4 other jurisdictions use the corporate negligence of the
institution in the selection of their employees as the basis for liability. 5
The rationale advanced in favor of immunity varies: (1) Some courts adopt
the trust fund theory, which is that the object of the trust fund of the charity
would become frustrated and ultimately destroyed if subjected to such liabi-
lity;6 (2) others argue that it would be against public policy not to allow in-
;munity,' because gifts to a charitable institution should be encouraged, but to
subject them to tort liability is to discourage potential donors,' furthermore,
14. See Bateson v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich. 582, 106 N.W. 1104 (1906).
15. See General Discount Corp. v. City of Detroit, 306 Mich. 458, 11 N.W.2d 203
(1943).
16. See Blanchard v. City of Detroit, 253 Mich. 491, 235 N.W. 230 (1931) ("If
payment of a tax is involuntary, in absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, it may
he recovered although there is no express statutory provision therefore.").
1. See 3 Scott, Trusts, § 402 (1939).
2. Ibid.
3. See, e. g., Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443
(1933) (Wife of patient recovered for injuries sustained from falling on hospital stairs).
4. See, e.g., Tucker v. Moblie Infirmary Ass'n., 196 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1914).
5. See Fisher v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hospital Ass'n., 137 W. Va. 723, 73 S.E.2d 667
(1952) (Corporate negligence may also include the purchase of any faulty equipment Dr
supplies by the institution).
6. See, e.g., Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 "S.E. 887 (1918); Great-
rex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137 (1918).
7. See, e .g., Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d
749 (1943); Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 SE. 785 (1921).
8. Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 AtI. 898- (1910).
